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EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF HARMELIN v. MICHIGAN
"When a man causes a disfigurement in his neighbor, as he has done
it shall be done to him, fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth; as he has disfigured a man, he shall be disfigured. "'
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted. "'2 Whether the prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments" contains by implication a guarantee that the
punishment must be proportionate to the offense, i.e., that it "fit the
crime," is a question that has provoked widely diverse reactions from
the Supreme Court in the past century.' In the recent case of
Harmelin v. Michigan,4 the Court held in a five to four decision that
a state may impose life imprisonment without possibility of parole on
a first offender for possession of 650 grams of cocaine.' The
majority declared that such a sentence did not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment. In separate opinions, however, a bloc of three
' Leviticus 24:19-20. By implicitly prohibiting the taking of more than an eye for
an eye, the lex talionis is the first documented proportionality guarantee.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
' See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 275 (1983) (the Eighth Amendment guarantees
that noncapital sentencing cannot be disproportionate to the offense); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263 (1980) (federal courts should not examine whether a given sentence is
proportional to the crime); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (the Eighth
Amendment prohibits excessivepunishment); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (the Eighth Amendment is directed against all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the offense charged) (Field,
J., dissenting).
4 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
'Id. at 2701-02.
6 Id.
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justices declared that such a sentence was not disproportionate to the
offense,7 and Justice Scalia, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
maintained that no proportionality guarantee exists Consequently,
the Court's previous opinion in Solem v. Helm,9 which expressly
determined that the Eighth Amendment guaranteed proportionality in
noncapital sentencing, while not overruled, was left "eviscerated.""0
This Note provides an overview of proportionality jurisprudence, and
argues that Harmelin v. Michigan renders the implications of the line
of constitutional authority that preceded the opinion in doubt,
furnishing no clear guidance for lower courts on how to analyze
future Eighth Amendment challenges to the length of prison
sentences.
L Proportionality and The Eighth Amendment
in Historical Perspective
A. History of the "Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause
vis a vis Proportionality
In England at the turn of the millennium and for several
centuries thereafter, the most common criminal punishment was not
imprisonment, but the discretionary amercement." An amercement
was a mandatory amount of money or goods demanded in the king's
name as punishment for some transgression -- the parallel of a
modern fine. 2 By the thirteenth century excessive amercements were
"so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta"3 were devoted
to their regulation." 4 Chapter 14 of the Magna Carta explicitly
' Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was joined in his opinion
by Justices O'Connor and Souter. Id.
' Id. at 2686 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
9 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
10 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2714 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
" Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 845 (1969). See also Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 275, 284 n.8 (1983).
2 Granucci, supra note 11, at 845 n.27.
13 See J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 230 (1965).
14 Granucci, supra note 11, at 845.
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designated as fundamental law a prohibition of excessiveness in such
punishments: "A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offense,
except in accordance with the degree of the offence."15
A fourteenth century document which purports to be a copy
of the laws of Edward the Confessor16 extended the policy of the
amercements clause to cover physical punishments as well: "We do
forbid that a person shall be condemned to death for a trifling
offense. But for the correction of the multitude, extreme punishment
shall be inflicted according to the nature and extent of the offense. "17
For the majority of wrongdoers throughout the Middle Ages,
prisons served only as waiting places pending some other, more
fearsome, disposal.18 Yet, as incarceration came into use as a
criminal penalty in and of itself, at least one English court reiterated
the proportionality principle and held that "imprisonment ought
always to be according to the quality of the offence."19
Strangely, while proportionality had its roots in the infancy of
English law, it was not until relatively recent times that England
prohibited barbarous methods of punishments.2" Although excessive
punishments were prohibited by the Magna Carta, there apparently
was no legal objection to particular modes of punishment, and as late
as the mid-nineteenth century, heinous punishments were authorized
for heinous crimes.21
Historical sources do not clearly resolve whether the framers
of the American Constitution intended the Eighth Amendment to
J . C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 323 (1965).
16 English king (1004 - 1066). THE CAMBRIDGE BIOGRAPICAL DICTIONARY 464
(Magnus Magnusson ed., 1990).
"7 Granucci, supra note 11, at 846 (citing FAITH THOMPSON, THE FIRST CENTURY
OF THE MAGNA CARTA: WHY IT PERSISTED AS A DoCUMENT 46 (1925)).
S Sentences of Imprisonment: A Review of Maximum Penalties (Report of the
Advisory Council on the Penal System, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1978),
reprinted in NICHOLAS N. KrfTRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING,
AND CORRECTIONS 355 (1981).
19 Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615).
'o Beheading and quartering were not abolished in England until 1870. 33 & 34
Vict., ch. 23, § 31 (1870) (Eng.).
21 See id; see also infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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include a proportionality requirement. 22 The language of the Eighth
Amendment is virtually identical to a provision of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689.' One traditional view' regards the English
provision as banning torture and barbarous punishments such as those
imposed during the "Bloody Assizes" of Chief Justice Jeffreys. 5
In 1685, James II succeeded his brother, Charles II, as the
King of England. 6 Soon thereafter, Charles' bastard son, James, the
Duke of Monmouth, launched an abortive rebellion.27 In response,
James II established a special commission to try the insurgents and he
named Jeffreys as its director.28
Beginning in August of 1685, this commission, now known
as the "Bloody Assizes," found hundreds of people guilty of
treason.29 The sentence imposed upon those convicted was the
standard penalty for that offense at that time: the condemned man
was dragged by a cart to the gallows, where he was hanged by the
neck, cut down while still alive, disembowelled and his bowels burnt
before him, and then beheaded and quartered.3 ° Women found guilty
I See Raoul Berger, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, in THE BILL OF
Rioirrs 303, 305 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (there is no tradition of
proportionality in either English or American law); Granucci, supra note 11, at 860-65
(the framers misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights and did not adopt the
proportionality principle implicit in its punishments clause); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An
Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine,
24 BUFF. L. REv. 783 (1975) (the framers recognized that the punishments clause barred
disproportionate penalties but the judiciary misread their intent).
I The tenth declaratory clause of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 reads: "That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689) (Eng.).
I Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REv. 54, 55 n.2
(1910).
I Id. George Jeffreys, the 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem (1648-89), was an English
judge. THE CAMBRmIGE BIOGRAPHICAL DICIONARY 777 (Magnus Magnusson ed.,
1990).
' Charles Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the
Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOoY 378, 378 (1980).
7 id.
n Id.
2 Granucci, supra note 11, at 853-54.
30 Id.
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were simply beheaded or burned.31
When [the Bloody Assizes] ended, scores had been
executed and 1,260 were awaiting the hangman in
three counties .... Mere death was considered much
too mild for the villagers and farmers rounded up in
these raids. The directions to a high sheriff were to
provide an ax, a cleaver, 'a furnace or cauldron to
boil their heads and quarters, and soil to boil
therewith, half a bushel to each traitor, and tar to tar
them with, and a sufficient number of spears and
poles to fix their heads and quarters' along the
highways. One could have crossed a good part of
northern England by their guidance.32
Several commentators have attributed the Declaration of Rights
provision outlawing cruel and unusual punishments to popular outrage
against these aforementioned proceedings."
In his widely cited article, Anthony Granucci34 rejects the
theory that the punishments clause in the English Bill of Rights was
intended as a response to the Bloody Assizes. 3' Granucci argues
instead that the punishments clause was a reaction to the punishment
imposed on Titus Oates.36 Oates, a minister, was convicted in 1685
of perjury during the reign of Protestant Charles II for falsely
accusing several nobles of treason." Oates was tried during the reign
of Catholic James II and sentenced (coincidently by the same Chief
Justice Jeffreys) 31 to a heavy fine, life imprisonment, whippings and
31 Id.
32 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 254 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 154-55 (1965)).
33 See, e.g., RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LmERTIES 236 n.103 (1959);
Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REv. 54, 55 (1910).
m Granucci, supra note 11.
31 Id. at 856-59.
3 id. at 856-57.
37 d.
38 Id.
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pillorying four times a year, and defrocking.39 Defrocking was a
penalty only within the power of ecclesiastical courts at the time, and
it was objected to on that ground."' Parliament denied Oates' petition
for release; those who dissented labelled the punishment "cruel and
unusual. "41
This leads Granucci to conclude that the phrase "cruel and
unusual" in the English Bill of Rights was not intended to outlaw
barbarous punishments, but rather to object to penalties not
authorized by law and as a reiteration of the English policy against
disproportional punishments.42 However, Granucci claims that the
American framers misinterpreted the English meaning of "cruel and
unusual punishments," and intended the Eighth Amendment to outlaw
only barbarous methods of punishment.43
Little evidence exists recounting the debates on the adoption
of the Eighth Amendment.' What material there is shows concern
not with excessiveness, but with the mode of punishment. Patrick
Henry,45 at the Virginia Convention, lobbied for a bill of rights, and
said:
In this business of legislation, your members of
Congress will loose the restriction of not imposing
excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. . . .What
has distinguished our ancestors? That they would not
admit of torture or cruel and barbarous punishment.
But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil
law in preference to that of the common law . . . of
9 Id. at 858.
4 Granucci, supra note 11, at 858.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 860.
43 Id. at 860-65.
"Id.
45 American patriot and orator (1736-99). THE CAMBRIDGE BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 698 (Magnus Magnusson ed., 1990).
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torturing to extort a confession of the crime."
In a similar vein, at the same convention, George Mason47
also spoke of the need to prevent the government from using torture:
For that one clause expressly provided, that no man
can give evidence against himself; and that . . . in
those countries where torture is used, evidence was
extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of
the bill of rights, provided, that no cruel and unusual
punishments shall be inflicted; therefore torture was
included in the prohibition.48
The Eighth Amendment received virtually no attention during
the House debates on the Bill of Rights.49 However, at the time of
its adoption, there was some recognition of the fact that the Eighth
Amendment was a flexible interdiction that might change in meaning
as the mores of society change.50 One commentator noted that the
general opinion at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted was
that it prohibited every punishment that was not "evidently
necessary. 51
43 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTrUTION 447-48 (J. Elliott ed., 1901), quoted in Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BuFF.
L. REV. 738, 828 n.216 (1975).
' American revolutionary statesman (1725-92). THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1443 (Second College ed. 1985).
43 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1085 (R. Rutland ed., 1970).
" The entire deliberation amounts to less than one-half of one page of transcript. 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 754 (Joseph Gales ed., 1832).
' Id. Mr. Livermore of New Hampshire, albeit in opposing adoption of the Eighth
Amendment, stated: "What is meant by the term excessive bail? Who are to be the
judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine."
Id.
S1 WILLIAM BRADFORD, AN ENQUIRY How FAR THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH IS
NECESSARY IN PENNSYLVANIA 4 (1793).
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B. Pre-Harmelin Supreme Court Interpretation of the
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause
vis a vis Proportionality
The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret the
punishments clause did not arise until 1866, seventy-five years after
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, in Pervear v.
Commonwealth.52 Significantly, Pervear involved a proportionality
challenge to a sentence imposed by a state court.53 The defendant
had been convicted of selling liquor without a license, and was
sentenced to pay a fifty dollar fine and serve three months in jail at
hard labor.' The Court disposed of the appeal by holding that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states,55 but nonetheless
acknowledged the concept that punishments must be proportional by
noting that there was "nothing excessive, cruel, or unusual" about the
sentence. 
56
The next reference to proportionality in a Supreme Court case
appears in Justice Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont.57 The
petitioner was a New York liquor merchant who had been convicted
of 457 counts of illegal sale of liquor to residents of Vermont.5" He
was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty dollars per offense plus
prosecution fees and one month in jail or, in the alternative, to serve
approximately seventy-nine years in prison at hard labor.59 O'Neil
attacked his conviction on commerce clause grounds, claiming that
the Constitution prohibited Vermont from criminalizing the sale of
goods to residents by a nonresident.' The Court dismissed O'Neil's
appeal, holding that no federal question had been presented.61
52 72 U.S. 475 (1866).
SId. at 479.
I id. at 480.
Id.
6Id.
5 144 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 326-27.
60 Id. at 334.
6' Id. at 331.
1992] PROPORTIONALITY 193
Justice Field dissented, arguing that the sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment.62 He interpreted the punishments clause as being
directed not only against the infliction of torture, but against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity were greatly
disproportionate to the offense.63 Justice Field went on to add that
"[t]he whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the
bail required, or fine imposed, or punishment inflicted. "6 Justice
Field rejected the reasoning that O'Neil's sentence was warranted as
a cumulative sentence for many separate offenses, because it "[w]as
greatly beyond anything required by any humane law for the
offences. "65
Weems v. United States,' decided eighteen years later, is
described in later decisions alternately as "the landmark case,"67 and
as a case that cannot be applied "without regard to its peculiar
facts." 68 The petitioner in Weems was an official of the United States
Government of the Philippine Islands.69 Weems was convicted of
falsifying a public document7" and sentenced by a territorial court to
fifteen years of cadena temporal.71 The punishment called for
incarceration at hard labor with chains fastened to the wrists and
ankles at all times. 72  Additionally, the prisoner was permanently
barred from holding any position of public trust, was subject to
government surveillance for the rest of his life, and was stripped of
"the rights of parental authority. 73
6' O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 340.
65 Id.
6217 U.S. 349 (1910).
6 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 324 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
"Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980).
6Weems, 217 U.S. at 357.
70 The statute Weems was convicted under was codified at the time as PHIL. PENAL
CODE § 56. Id. at 358.
7' Id. Cadena temporal is imprisonment for less than a life term. BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 203 (6th ed. 1990).
' Weems, 217 U.S. at 364.
73 Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed.74 Justice McKenna, writing for
the majority,75 stated that the penalty "[i]s cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment.
It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the
condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree
and kind. "76 This language indicates that it was the combination of
an excessive but customary mode of punishment as well as its
manifest brutality which made the punishment unconstitutional. The
opinion cited both the Pervear Court's acknowledgement of
proportionality" and Justice Fields' dissent in O'Neil with approval, 7
and noted that punishments like cadena temporal "amaze those who
... believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense. "9
The Weems Court rejected the interpretation that the Eighth
Amendment proscribes only tortures like those employed in England
during the late seventeenth century ." Justice McKenna wrote that
"[the Eighth Amendment is] progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
4 Id. at 382. The applicable provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights was
determined to have the same meaning as the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. at 367.
75 The majority of the Court consisted of four justices: Chief Justice Fuller and
Justices Harlan, Day, and McKenna. Dissenting were Justices White and Holmes.
Seven members heard the arguments, but Justice Brewer died before the decision was
announced. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357 n.1. In his Harmelin opinion, Justice Scalia
attempted to diminish the importance of the Court's decision in Weems by highlighting
that it was decided by four justices; Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2699, 2700
n.13 (opinion of Scalia, J.). However, it is safe to assume that Justice Brewer was
sympathetic to the rationale of the Weems Court, and would have been a fifth vote for
reversal, since he had joined Justice Field in his dissent in O 'Neil. Granucci, supra note
11, at 843.
76 Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
" Id. at 369 (citing Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475 (1866)). See supra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
7 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369, 371 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339
(Field, J., dissenting)). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
" Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-67.
8o See Weems, 217 U.S. at 375-76 ("the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment was not 'intended to warn against merely erratic modes of punishment or
torture, but applied expressly to "bail", "fines" and "punishments."'') (quoting State v.
Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 427 (1878)).
194 [Vol. X
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enlightened by a humane justice.""
Justice Edward White strenuously dissented.82 Justice White
argued that the history of the Eighth Amendment indicated that its
purpose was the prohibition of barbarous methods of punishment,
and, citing the trial of Titus Oates, 3 those punishments which were
outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court to impose." Justice
White saw no proportionality principles at work in the English Bill
of Rights, noting the inherent ferocity of English methods of
punishment which existed through the time of the American
Revolution. 5 Justice White contended that the framers were entirely
aware of the brutal character of prevailing English law, and
nevertheless chose to duplicate the wording of the English Bill of
"' Weeras, 217 U.S. at 378. In emphasizing the proposition that the framers could
not have intended solely to "prevent an exact repetition of history," Justice McKenna set
forth in one paragraph a justification for a progressive interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment that subsequent cases on the same subject have not matched in clarity or
eloquence:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed
to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief
Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as
human institutions can approach it.' The future is their care and
provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no
prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution,
therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be
as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power.
Its general principles would have little value and be converted by
precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in
words might be lost in reality.
Id. at 373.
2 Id. at 382 (White, J., dissenting).
83 See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
" Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 393. Justice White chose "for the sake of brevity" not to review these
punishments. Id. This virtue is not shared by the author of this Note: the burning of
female felons was not outlawed until 1790, and certain male miscreants risked
disembowelment until 1814. Granucci, supra note 11, at 856.
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Rights. 6 Justice White concluded that the limitation of legislative
discretion in the setting of criminal punishments violated "the
elementary rules of construction."7
The Court's unanimous decision six years later in Badders v.
United States 88 obscured the issue of Weems' breadth. In Badders,
a defendant contested concurrent sentences of five years in prison and
a $1000 fine on each of seven counts of mail fraud.8 9 The Court
barely acknowledged the Eighth Amendment challenge to the
sentence, concluding that there was "no ground for declaring the
punishment unconstitutional. "9 The Court employed no
proportionality analysis at all, possibly, one commentator has noted,
because the sentence did not appear to be disproportionate to the
crimes involved.9" In any event, the notion that Weems applies only
to those punishments like cadena temporal, that are cruel, torturous,
or barbarous in the method in which they are inflicted, seems to have
begun with Badders.1
In Trop v. Dulles,93 a plurality of the Court struck down
forfeiture of citizenship as a penalty for wartime desertion because
"the civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime. " '
Although the rationale for the decision is vague, proportionality
analysis is apparent in the plurality's flat rejection of the contention
that the loss of citizenship was an excessive punishment in relation to
the nature of the offense, since, the Court reasoned, wartime
desertion was punishable by death. 95 The Trop Court agreed with the
assertion in Weems that the Eighth Amendment is not static but
"Weems, 217 U.S. at 394-95 (White, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 410.
0 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
9Id. at 393.
90Id. at 394.
91 Nancy Keir, Solem v. Heim: Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause to Require 'Proportionality 'of Prison Sentences, 33 CATH.
U. L. REV. 479, 484 n.34 (1984).
2 Id.
93 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
94 Id. at 102.
"s Id. at 99.
196 [Vol. X
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progressive, and stated that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society. "
The first case to find that a term of imprisonment could
violate the Eighth Amendment was Robinson v. California,97 where
the defendant was convicted under a statute that made it illegal to be
"addicted to the use of narcotics. "98 Because the statute was read as
imposing criminal status without requiring criminal intent or a
manifest act, the Court found imprisonment to be cruel and unusual. 99
It emphasized that judgments about proportionality cannot be made
in a vacuum: "Imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold.""0
In Ingraham v. Wright,'0 ' a case involving the constitutionality
of corporal punishment; the Court held that the punishments clause
limits criminal punishment in three ways: (1) it "imposes substantive
limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such,"'" (2) it
proscribes the kind of punishment that can be imposed, 3 and (3) it
prohibits excessive punishment."° That same year, in Coker v.
Georgia,"0 5 the Court, in holding that death is a disproportionate
punishment for rape and therefore cruel and unusual, defined
punishment as unconstitutionally excessive "if it (1) makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence
'6 id. at 101.
'7370 U.S. 660 (1962). Moreover, Robinson affirmatively established the
application of the cruel and unusual punishments clause to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 675.
SId. at 660 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (1962)).
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666, 667.
Io Id. at 667.
o 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
'o Id. at 667 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
t0 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
114 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910)).
101 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime. ""°) Although Coker was a death penalty case, nothing in the
Coker analysis suggests that the principles of proportionality are
applicable solely to capital cases.107
In a five to four decision, the Court in Rummel v. Estelle °s
rejected the argument that a prison sentence, excessive in its term of
years to the gravity of the underlying offense, constituted cruel and
unusual punishment." The opinion plainly stated that, except in
extremely rare cases, federal courts should not examine whether a
given prison sentence is proportional to the crime.110
Rummel was convicted under a recidivist statute that dictated
a sentence of life imprisonment upon conviction of a third felony. 1 I
What made Rummel's case notable was the trifling nature of his prior
offenses. Convicted of "obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses," 1 2
Rummel had been convicted of similar felonies twice before, once for
fraudulent use of a credit card in the purchase of goods worth $80,
and for passing a forged check worth $28.36. " 3 Nevertheless,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, concluded that the statute
was constitutional." 4 Outside the unique situations of the death
penalty or the cadena temporal of Weems,"I Justice Rehnquist wrote
'06 Id. at 592.
"o See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), where the Court, in express
reliance on proportionality principles, vacated the death sentence imposed on the
nontriggerman participant in a felony that resulted in murder, where there had been no
proof of an intent to kill on the part of the defendant. Id. at 795-96, 801. Compare
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 135 (1987) (upholding the death penalty against defendant
when participation in the felony results in murder and the defendant possesses the
requisite mental state of reckless indifference).
"o 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
109 Id. at 284-85.
11o Id. at 274.
"I TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925), modified as TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264.
1,2 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266. The offense was codified as TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
art. 1410(b), reprinted in TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. app. at 688 (Vernon 1974). See
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266 n.5.
3 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265.
114 Id.
"I See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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that "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision
of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as
felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment
in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is
purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 16 Justice Rehnquist felt
this conclusion was mandated at least in part because of the difficultly
in developing objective judicial criteria for the determination of the
proper length of a prison sentence.
1 1 7
Rummel sought to prove the disproportionality of his sentence
by showing the Court how he might have received a lighter sentence
in almost any other jurisdiction."' The Court rejected this
comparative analysis, pointing out that state-to-state variations on
parole eligibility complicated any comparison of sentences actually
given. 119  In addition, Justice Rehnquist stressed that
interjurisdictional evaluation trampled on conventional federalist
principles: "Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the
distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any
other State." 20  In response to a hypothetical proposed by the
dissent,12 ' however, Justice Rehnquist retreated, and conceded in a
fateful footnote that "[t]his is not to say that a proportionality
principle would not come into play ... if [for example] a legislature
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment. "12
Hutto v. Davis,123 decided by the Supreme Court two years
later, is significant less for its affirmance of Rummel than for an
16 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
17 Id. at 275.
11 Id. at 277.
.. Id. at 280. The Court found it significant that under Texas' "relatively liberal"
parole policy, Rummel could become eligible for parole "in as little as twelve years."
Id.
'2 Id. at 282.
121 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 274 n. 11. Footnote 11 created a critical inconsistency in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, since once the allowance is made that there are prison sentences
that could be unconstitutionally disproportionate, it is no longer logical to assert that "the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."
Id. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
12 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
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illustration of the initially recalcitrant attitude on the part of lower
federal courts when it came to following Rummel. The respondent
had been convicted in a Virginia state court of possession with intent
to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana and was
sentenced to forty years in prison.124 The district court, on habeas
corpus review, held that the punishment was cruel and unusual.'25
This decision predated Rummel by three years.
The district court in Davis relied on a four element test
provided by an earlier Fourth Circuit case, Hart v. Coiner.126 The
Hart test looked at the following factors to determine whether a term
of imprisonment was violative of the Eighth Amendment: First, the
nature of the offense, i.e., its violence or nonviolence; second, the
legislative purpose behind the choice of the particular punishment
prescribed for the offense; third, an examination of punishments
levied for the same crime in other jurisdictions; and lastly, a
comparison of other penalties assessed for other crimes in the same
jurisdiction.127 The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc the year after
Rummel, affirmed Davis,2 ' including, by implication, the lower
court's reliance on Hart.
The Supreme Court reversed in a sharply worded per curiam
opinion, "[b]ecause the Court of Appeals failed to heed our decision
in Rummel." 29  In another footnote, however, the Court
acknowledged a continuing concern with the Rummel overtime
I Id. at 371.
"2 Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (W.D.Va. 1977), rev'd sub nom.
Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (en
bane), vacated sub nor. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Davis v.
Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd sub nor. Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
121483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974).
'7 Hart, 483 F.2d at 140-42. A slightly modified version of the Hart test was also
proposed by the dissenters in Rummel. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
"~ Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd sub
nor. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). The Supreme Court had
originally remanded to the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Rummel.
Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
129 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372.
1992] PROPORTIONALITY 201
parking hypothetical, 3 ' this time with a somewhat more generous
wording: "We noted in Rummel that there could be situations in
which the proportionality principle would come into play, such as 'if
a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life
imprisonment. '"131
Just three years after Rummel, in Solem v. Helm,132 the Court
in a five to four decision expressly adopted the proportionality
principle and applied a slightly modified version of the Hart test to
facts similar to those before the Court in Rummel. The defendant in
Solem was convicted of passing a bad check for $100,133 an offense
which carried a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $5000
fine if it had been a first offense. 134  Because of a prior criminal
record," however, Helm was sentenced pursuant to a South Dakota
recidivist statute136 to life imprisonment without parole.137 Justice
Powell, who wrote the dissent in Rummel, wrote for the majority in
Solem, and emphasized that a critical distinction between the two
cases lay in the fact that Rummel's life sentence carried with it the
's Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n. 11. See also supra note 122 and accompanying text;
Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3.
"' Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also
Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
132 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
'3 Id. at 281.
134 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (1979).
13' Helm had six prior convictions which the Court characterized as nonviolent
felonies, including three for third degree burglary and one for driving while intoxicated.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-80.
136 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). The statute
provided that a defendant convicted of a fourth felony faced a sentence enhanced to the
penalty provided for a "Class 1 felony." Id. A Class 1 felony in South Dakota carried
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(2) (1967
ed., Supp. 1978) recodified as S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982).
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-82.
137 Helm was not ineligible for parole simply because he was convicted under the
recidivist statute. Under South Dakota's sentencing scheme any prisoner serving a life
sentence was ineligible for parole. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-15-4 (1979). See
Solem, 463 U.S. at 282.
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possibility of parole, and Helm's did not.13
This distinction permitted the Court to maintain that it was not
overruling Rummel, but was instead comporting with it. In the
Court's view, Solem's holding flowed logically from its pre-Rummel
opinions, citing Weems, Trop, Robinson, Coker, and Ingraham
among others. 139 Justice Powell then pointed out that Rummel itself
acknowledged a proportionality principle in the overtime parking
footnote, 14 as well as in its statement that "one could argue ...
[that] the length of [the] sentence actually imposed is purely a matter
of legislative prerogative."' 41 By emphasizing the words one could
argue, Justice Powell proposed that "[t]he Court [in Rummel] did not
adopt the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument
was possible." '42 He then added that "[t]o the extent that the State
makes this argument here, we find it meritless. "143
The Court then provided a three-part proportionality test, and
held that the relevant factors to be considered might include: (1) the
nature of the offense and the severity of punishment; (2) the penalties
prescribed in the same jurisdiction for other, more serious, offenses;
and (3) the punishments imposed in other jurisdictions for the same
"3 A look at the way the Justices voted in each case may suggest a simpler reason
for the shift in the two decisions: Justice Blackmun simply changed his mind. In
Rummel, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun
were the majority. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264 (1980). Justices Powell,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 285. In Solem, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens were the majority. Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented. Id. at 304.
Justice Blackmun wrote no concurrence in Solem to explain why he changed his vote.
Shifting positions are not uncommon on the issue of proportionality. Justice
White opposed recognition of a proportionality principle in both Rummel and Solem, yet
wrote a blistering dissent to Harmelin in strong support of the Solem test. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
"3 Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-89.
I' ld. at 288 (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11). See supra note 122 and
accompanying text. The dissenters in Solem conceded that Rummel and Davis "leave
open the possibility that in extraordinary cases ... it might be permissible for a court
to decide whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime." Solem, 463
U.S. at 311 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
141 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
142 Solem, 463 U.S. at 288-89 n.14.
t Id. at 288-89.
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offense.'" After noting that "no one factor will be dispositive in a
given case,"'45 the Court concluded after application of these factors
to Helm's sentence that it violated the Eighth Amendment."'
The Solem Court stressed that it was not adopting a general
rule of appellate review of all prison sentences. 47 Courts were still
required to "grant substantial deference" 14  to legislative
determinations and trial court judgments when considering a
proportionality challenge. 149  In the view of the Solem Court,
however, such deference should not prevent courts from determining
that a sentence is so disproportionate as to give rise to an Eighth
Amendment claim. 5'
IL Harmelin v. Michigan
A. The Facts'
In the early morning hours of May 12, 1986, in Oak Park,
Michigan, two police officers stopped Ronald Harmelin for failing to
make a complete stop at a red light.'52 After producing his driver's
license and vehicle registration, Harmelin informed the officers that
he was carrying a pistol in an ankle holster.'53 Harmelin then
produced a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon. " Ultimately,
Harmelin was searched and the officers discovered in his pockets
144 Id. at 290-92.
I4 d. at 291 n.17.
'"Id. at 303.
47 Id. at 290 n.16.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
149 'd.
130 Id.
Except where otherwise noted, the facts are those provided by Brief for the
Petitioner at 2-4, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272)
[hereinafter Harmelin's Brief]. Respondent accepted Petitioner's account of the facts as
they were presented in Petitioner's brief. Brief for Respondent at 1, Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-7272).
'52 Harnelin's Brief, supra note 151, at 2.
153 id.
154 Id.
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some marijuana cigarettes, assorted pills, ten small packets of
cocaine, three small vials of cocaine, and a beeper.155 Harmelin was
then placed under arrest. In stark contrast to defendants Rummel and
Helm, Ronald Harmelin had never been in trouble with the law. 56
Later, the police impounded Harmelin's 1977 Ford and
searched the trunk.157 The search revealed a closed travel bag.
Inside the travel bag was a closed shaving kit bag containing $2900
and two bags containing 672.5 grams of cocaine.15
After a bench trial, Harmelin was convicted of possession of
more than 650 grams of cocaine 5 9 and possession of a firearm during
155 Id.
" William Rummel and Jerry Helm had ten felony convictions between them. See
supra notes 113 & 135 and accompanying text. This was Ronald Harmelin's first arrest.
Letter from Ronald Harmelin to Edward McGowan 1 (Oct. 16, 1991) (on file with the
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights). See also Michigan Department of
Corrections Presentence Investigation Report, reprinted in Joint Appendix, Briefs for the
Petitioner and the Respondent, Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-
7272).
'57 Harmelin's Brief, supra note 151, at 2.
1-" Id. Six hundred and seventy-two grams equals roughly one and one-half pounds.
Undeniably a large amount of cocaine, it nonetheless merits emphasis that evidence
indicated that Harmelin was merely a "mule," or carrier, and not a "kingpin." His only
assets at the time of his arrest were $597 and his nine year old car. While Harmelin's
fingerprints were found on a book inside the travel bag, they were not found inside the
shaving kit bag that contained the money and cocaine. Harmelin's Brief, supra note
151, at 3-4.
13 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7403 (Supp.1990-1991) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person shall not knowingly or intentionally possess a
controlled substance...
(2) A person who violates this section as to:
(a) A controlled substance ... and:
(i) Which is in an amount of
650 grams or more of any
mixture containing that
controlled substance is guilty
of a felony and shall be
imprisoned for life.
Id.
Ironically, the legislative history of the statute shows that its intended targets
were recidivist drug dealers and kingpins. See Harmelin's Brief, supra note 151, at app.
5. Between its enactment in 1978 and late 1990, 123 people were sentenced to life
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the commission of a felony. 1 0 The sentence authorized by statute for
the drug possession was mandatory; the sentencing judge had no
discretion in its imposition and was not permitted to take into
consideration the circumstances of the crime or the fact that this was
Harmelin's first offense. 6 ' On April 30, 1987, Ronald Harmelin was
sentenced by Judge Schnelz of the Oakland County Circuit Court to
a term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the drug
possession,162 and a two year term for the firearm conviction.' 63
Harmelin appealed his conviction on several grounds,'"
including a two-pronged Eighth Amendment claim -- first, that a
sentence of life without parole was unconstitutionally disproportionate
to the seriousness of his crime,165 and second, that it was cruel and
unusual to impose such a sentence without consideration of mitigating
factors.'" In affirming the sentence, Michigan's Court of Appeals
without parole under the statute, and of that number almost half were first time
offenders. Ruth Marcus, Life in Prison for Cocaine Possession? High Court Weighing
Strict Michigan Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1990, at Al. Most of the narcotic offenders
sentenced under the law were not drug kingpins, but comparatively minor figures.
Aaron Epstein, Supreme Test for No-Parole Law: Justices Ask Tough Questions as
Michigan Dealer Appeals Life Sentence, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 1990, at 1B.
160 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.227(2) (West 1991).
... See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
162 MICH. Cow1,. LAWS § 791.234(4) (West 1991) makes clear that a person
convicted of possessing this amount of a controlled substance is ineligible for parole.
The statute provides in pertinent part:
A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years other than
. . . prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of
imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has
served 10 calendar years of the sentence is subject to the jurisdiction
of the parole board and may be released on parole.
Id. (emphasis added). MICH. Cow. LAWS § 791.233b[1](b) defines a "major controlled
substance offense" as, inter alia, a violation of § 333.7403, the possession statute. See
supra note 159.
1 Harmelin's Brief, supra note 151, at 2.
'"In addition to his Eighth Amendment claim, Harmelin contended that the searches
of his car and his person violated the Fourth Amendment, and that he was deprived of
effective assistance of counsel at trial. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 79-80
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989), afd, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
16 Harmelin's Brief, supra note 151, at 8.
166 Id.
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addressed Harmelin's Eighth Amendment argument with only two
words: "We disagree."167 The Supreme Court of Michigan denied
leave to appeal,1 6' and the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari. 169
B. The Decision
The Court, in a five to four decision, held that Harmelin's
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment; that "[slevere,
mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense ... 170
Harmelin v. Michigan is an unusually structured decision.
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
joined. 171  Before reaching the holding, however, Justice Scalia,
joined only by the Chief Justice, set out in twenty pages of what can
only be termed preambulatory dicta the view that the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee, that Solem was
incorrectly decided, and that what is cruel and unusual punishment
should be determined without reference to the particular offense.172
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the largest bloc of Justices
to hold that Harmelin's sentence was constitutional albeit for entirely
different reasons, then concurred in the judgment announced by
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. 173 The lopsided structure
of the opinion gives rise to the suspicion that there may have been
late defections from what may have originally been slated as a
majority opinion.
1' 440 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), af'd, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
11 People v. Harmelin, 434 Mich. 863 (1990).
'9 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). The Court limited the writ to the Eighth Amendment
issue. Id.
o Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701 (1991).
17 Id. at 2683.
1' Id. at 2680-2702 (opinion of Scalia, J.)
17 Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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i. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia's opinion is essentially a restatement of the
dissent in Weems -- that the Eighth Amendment applies to the mode
of punishment only, not the degree to which it is imposed.174 He
began his opinion with a recap of the Rummel, Davis, and Solem
holdings, with particular attention paid to correcting the subsequent
manifestations of the Rummel footnote175 and Justice Powell's reading
of the "one could argue" passage. 76 Pointing out the Court's newly
proclaimed freedoms when dealing with five to four decisions and the
lessened applicability of stare decisis to constitutional precedents,177
Justice Scalia declared that "Solem was simply wrong"178 and that
"the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. "179
Justice Scalia engaged in a lengthy gloss on the history of the
language of the punishments clause, relying to a great degree on
Granucci's article,18 ° with several notable exceptions. Justice Scalia
disagreed with Granucci's observation that proportionality was a
traditional right and privilege of Englishmen, noting that in 1791
England over two hundred crimes were punishable by death.8
Justice Scalia also differed with Granucci's postulate that the English
Declaration of Rights embodied a proportionality principle.'
In any event, Justice Scalia felt that what the English intended
'7 Id. at 2864; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910).
175 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2685 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); see supra note 122;
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.l1 (1980).
176 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2685-86 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); see supra note
116; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274.
'77 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing Payne v. Tennessee,
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)). In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
asserted that the principle of stare decisis did not require strict adherence to
constitutional decisions, particularly where the case was decided "by the narrowest of
margins, over spirited dissents." Id. at 2609-10. Absent from Justice Scalia's analysis
in Harmelin is the fact that Rummel was also a five to four decision over a "spirited
dissent." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
"m Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
179 Id.
's Granucci, supra note 11, at 839.
'8' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
... Id. at 2691 n.5.
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with their punishments clause should have little if any bearing on
American law if the framers meant something else in the clause they
adopted."8 3 Referring to Webster's .1828 dictionary definition of
"unusual" as meaning "such as is not in common use," '' Justice
Scalia determined that "by forbidding 'cruel and unusual
punishments', '85 the framers intended the punishments clause to
"disabl[e] the Legislature from authorizing particular 'modes' of
punishment -- specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not
regularly or customarily employed." 86
Justice Scalia conceded that "the language [of the punishments
clause] bears the construction ... that cruelty and unusualness are to
be determined not solely with reference to the punishment at issue
183 Id. at 2691.
194 Id.
185 Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality) (affirming the
death sentences imposed on 16 and 17 year-old defendants)). Justice Scalia premised his
entire opinion in Stanford on the distinction between "and" and "or," and maintained that
relief under the punishments clause could be granted only after a showing of both cruelty
"and" unusualness. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369-70. This rationale was followed by the
Harmelin majority. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701 ("Severe, mandatory penalties may
be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense...."). Notably, however,
Justice Scalia has argued that "or" can mean the same as "and." See Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 332 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the "Stay-put" provision of the Education
of the Handicapped Act prohibited state or local school authorities from unilaterally
excluding disabled children from classrooms for dangerous or disruptive conduct
growing out of their disabilities during the pendency of review hearings). See also
George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297,
1321 n.127 (1990).
186 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2691. Several commentators have argued that
imprisonment was a novel form of punishment to the framers, one not "regularly or
customarily employed." Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 22, at 835-36 n.256. It
was not until the nineteenth century that the American penitentiary system began to be
organized, and therefore obviously did not directly concern the framers. Id. Jails in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were devoted almost exclusively to holding
prisoners awaiting trial. One historian could find only nineteen cases imposing sentences
of imprisonment in New York between 1691 and 1776. DOUoLAs GREENBERO, CRIME
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK 1691-1776 125 n.53 (1974),
cited in Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to
Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 409, 414 (1983).
Punishments that were "regularly and customarily" employed by the colonials included
the stocks, pillorying, branding, whipping, mutilations, scarlet lettering, and the cutting
off of ears and nailing them to a board. GRABME NEWMAN, THE PuNISHMENT
RESPONSE 112-23 (1978).
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('Is life imprisonment a cruel and unusual punishment?') but with
reference to the crime for which it is imposed as well ('Is life
imprisonment cruel and unusual punishment for. possession of
unlawful drugs?'). '17 He went on, however, to assert that the
arguments against such a reading "seem to us conclusive."188
Justice Scalia's first argument was that if the framers meant
to mandate a proportionality guarantee, the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishment" was "an exceedingly vague and oblique way of saying
what Americans were well accustomed to saying more directly. "189
Second, Justice Scalia found it "quite peculiar" for cruelty and
unusualness to refer to the offense in question since the clause "[had]
application only to a new government that had never before defined
[any] offenses.""' ° Lastly, "and most conclusively," Justice Scalia
stated that his theory that the Eighth Amendment applied to the mode
of punishment only, and not to its degree, was confirmed by "all
available evidence of contemporary understanding. "191
After noting that "the Eighth Amendment received little
attention during the proposal and adoption of the Federal Bill of
Rights," 1" Justice Scalia declared that "[t]he actions of the First
Congress . . are of course persuasive evidence of what the
Constitution means. "193 Justice Scalia then proffered the fact that the
penalties provided by the First Congress for several dissimilar crimes
were identical: piracy, treason, and forgery of United States
securities were all punishable by death at the turn of the nineteenth
century. 1"
187 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2692 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
'AId.
1 Id. Compare Justice White's dissent, where he wonders where those same "plain-
talking Americans" were when the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures were
drafted. Id. at 2710 (White, I., dissenting).
19 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2693 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
191 Id.
Id. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2694 (opinion of Scalia, J.). But see Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), quoted in Justice White's dissent: "[it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2713 (White, J., dissenting).
'9 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2694 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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Justice Scalia weni on to assert that "the most persuasive
evidence" of what the punishments clause meant (and therefore, one
supposes, means) is found in early state decisions interpreting
comparable state constitutional amendments.19 Citing twelve such
state opinions spanning the nineteenth century,196 yet ignoring the
Court's own language in Pervear197 as well as Justice Field's dissent
in O'Neil,19 Justice Scalia nevertheless determined that "judicial
agreement that a 'cruel and unusual' . . . provision did not constitute
a proportionality requirement appears to have been universal. "199
Justice Scalia then reached the true purpose of his opinion:
Solem must be overruled, primarily because the "clear historical
guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine
which modes of punishment are 'cruel and unusual,"' do not lend
themselves to proportionality analysis. 2" Disproportionate penalties
only seem to be so, Justice Scalia felt, "because they were made for
other times or places, with different social attitudes, different criminal
epidemics, different public fears, and different prevailing theories of
penology. "201 Then, rather than getting caught in a Rummel-style
overtime parking footnote, 0 2 Justice Scalia added that "[t]his is not
to say that there are no absolutes; one can imagine extreme examples
that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept, '2 3
apparently proposing that before the Court could find a term of
imprisonment unconstitutionally excessive, a rational person in any
and/or every time or place would have to reject it. 21 Justice Scalia
'9 Id. at 2695.
'9 Id. at 2695-96.
197 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct at 2696 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
2W Id.
201 Id.
' See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
m Harmelin, 111 S.Ct at 2696 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
4 At first glance this standard appears to be merely a restatement of the Court's
highly deferential "rational relation" standard of review. However, when considered in
an Eighth Amendment framework, the phrase "in no time or place" brings to mind
disturbing interpretive possibilities. Justice Scalia seems to suggest that a rational person
in any historical context would have a view regarding the appropriate length of prison
sentences that would necessarily be consonant with constitutional principles in 1991.
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confidently added that "for the same reason these examples are easy
to decide, they are certain never to occur. 2"5
In rejecting the three Solem factors, Justice Scalia relied
heavily on their allowing for the imposition of subjective judicial
values, rather than deferring to what he saw as the more legitimate,
albeit still subjective, values of the legislature. 2" In Justice Scalia's
view, "[t]he real function of a constitutional proportionality principle,
... is to enable judges to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of
men and women has considered proportionate -- and to say that it is
not. "207
Justice Scalia attacked the first factor, the "inherent gravity of
the offense," by indicating the wide disparity among and within the
states in their differentiation between arguably "serious" and "more
serious" crimes .20' As far as Harmelin's offense was concerned,
Justice Scalia posited that the gravity of society's drug problem is a
subjective determination in and of itself, and that "[tihe Members of
the Michigan Legislature, and not [the Supreme Court], know the
situation on the streets of Detroit. "21 In a subjective aside, and in
apparent disregard of the precise offense for which Harmelin had
been convicted, Justice Scalia added that mere possession of a
controlled substance could not be separated from its use and
distribution, since possession "facilitat[ed] distribution, subject[ed] the
holder to the temptation of distribution, and rais[ed] the possibility of
theft by others who might distribute."21
The second factor failed, Justice Scalia argued, for the same
reason as the first. "One cannot compare the sentences imposed by
the jurisdiction for 'similarly grave' offenses if there is no objective
2 Id. at 2696-97.
m Id. at 2697.
W7 Id.
Id. at 2697-98.
2 Id. at 2698.
211 Harmelin, ill S. Ct. at 2698. Harmelin was convicted of possession only. Id.
at 2684. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. But see Carmona v. Ward, 439
U.S. 1091, 1096 (1979) ("To rationalize petitioners' sentences [for narcotics possession]
by invoking all evils attendant on or attributable to widespread drug trafficking is simply
not compatible with a fundamental premise of the criminal justice system, that
individuals are accountable only for their own criminal acts.") (Marshall, ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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standard of gravity. Judges will be comparing what they consider
comparable. "2" Additionally, Justice Scalia argued that a case could
be made for justifying differing punishment for "similarly grave"
offenses on deterrence grounds; since the deterrent impact of
punishment depends in part upon its certainty, offenses difficult to
detect may warrant steeper penalties than equivalent offenses that are
not. 21
2
Justice Scalia believed that the third Solem factor -- the
sentences imposed by other jurisdictions for the same crime -- "has
no conceivable relevance to the Eighth Amendment. "23 To Justice
Scalia, the perfect example of state-to-state differences in value
judgments lay in the possibility that one state could criminalize what
another state rewarded, as in protection being afforded an endangered
species in one jurisdiction and a bounty imposed on the same animal
in another. 214  "Though the different needs and concerns of other
states may induce them to treat simple possession of 672 grams of
cocaine as a relatively minor offense, 2 5 nothing in the Constitution
requires Michigan to follow suit. "216
Justice Scalia concluded by distinguishing "[o]ur 20th century
jurisprudence. "217 While he conceded that Weems contains language
that could support the theory that "mere disproportionality, by itself,
2"2 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2698.
212 Id.
213 id.
214 Id. at 2699.
225 Id. In West Virginia and Wyoming, Harmelin may have received a maximum
sentence of six months for the same offense. W. VA. CODE § 60A-4-401(c) (1989);
WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1031(c) (1988). In the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, the penalty for possession of 672.5 grams of
a mixture containing cocaine is one year or less in prison, or a fine of not more than
$10,000, or both. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(d) (1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
204.401(3), 903.1(1)(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C,
§ 34 (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-113(a)(16), (b) (Supp. 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-418(a), (c), 40-35-11(e)(1) (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
161.41(3m) (West 1989). If Harmelin had been convicted in federal court, as a first
offender he would have faced a maximum of one year in jail. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988
& Supp. 1990).
226 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2699.
217 Id.
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might make a punishment cruel and unusual,""1 8 he added that the
opinion could also be interpreted as holding that "only a 'unique..
. punishmen[t],' a form of imprisonment different from the 'more
traditional forms . . . imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system' can
violate the Eighth Amendment."" 9 Reasoning backwards, Justice
Scalia argued that since Weems "did not produce a decision
implementing [a constitutional requirement of proportionality] for six
decades, "220 he thought it "unlikely" to have announced one.221 This
argument seems particularly specious in light of the fact that the
Eighth Amendment itself was not construed by the Supreme Court
until Pervear in 1866, seven decades after its adoption.222
Finally, Justice Scalia characterized the proportionality
principle expressly announced in Coker 223 and Enmund 224 as
an aspect of our death penalty jurisprudence, rather
than a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law.
.. . Proportionality review is one of several respects
in which we have held that 'death is different,' and
have imposed protections that the Constitution
nowhere else provides. We would leave it there but
extend it no further. 125
218 Id.
219 Id. at 2700 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980)). This
theory of the Eighth Amendment's applicability would support an argument that
pillorying, a form of imprisonment well known to the American colonials, whereby the
offender is fastened to a framework by the neck and wrists and exposed to public scorn,
is constitutional. See supra note 186.
' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700. Justice Scalia was presumably alluding to Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
22' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700.
"" See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
2 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See supra notes 105-07 and
accompanying text.
224 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). See supra note 107.
2 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701.
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
it. Justice Kennedy's Opinion
The concurrence disregarded the historical argument and
claimed to join in the judgment of the Court for stare decisis
reasons.226 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the case history on
the subject affirmed that the punishments clause encompassed a
"narrow proportionality principle, ,227 one which had application to
noncapital sentences.22
Noting the apparent tension between Rummel and Solem,
Justice Kennedy nevertheless determined they yielded "common
principles" which gave consistency to "the uses and limits of
proportionality review. ,22' The first common principle was that the
setting of the lengths of prison terms had its primacy in the legislative
branch, and that "[rieviewing courts . . . should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess
.... "I' The second principle was that "the Eighth Amendment did
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory, "31 perhaps
intimating that if a state legislature wanted to base its theories of
punishment exclusively on deterrent and retributive precepts, and
eliminate entirely concerns of rehabilitation or reform, it would not
offend the punishments clause.232 The third principle recognized the
validity and often beneficial effect of marked divergences in state-to-
state theories of punishment and lengths of prescribed prison terms.
233
Finally, Justice Kennedy recognized the principle which cautioned
that proportionality review by federal courts should be informed by
s Id. at 2702 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 Id.
2 Id. at 2703.
229 Id.
m Id. at 2703-04 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 275, 290 (1983)). See supra
note 148 and accompanying text.
" Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22 Near the conclusion of his concurrence Justice Kennedy observed that
"[reasonable minds may differ about the efficacy" of such a sentencing scheme, and that
"[tihe accounts of pickpockets at Tyburn hangings are a reminder of the limits of the
law's deterrent force." Id. at 2709.
2" Id. at 2704.
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"objective factors to the maximum extent possible. 234
These subsidiary principles, Justice Kennedy wrote, informed
the ultimate one: "the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime. 235
Applying these principles to the present case, Justice Kennedy
observed that while Harmelin and Helm were sentenced to the same
severe penalty, "[p]etitioner's crime ... was far more grave than the
crime at issue in Solem. ,,236 Justice Kennedy rejected the notion that
Harmelin's crime, like the one at issue in Solem, was "one of the
most passive felonies a person could commit."2" Justice Kennedy,
like Justice Scalia, refused to limit his analysis of Harmelin's offense
to that for which he was actually convicted. "Possession, use, and
distribution of illegal drugs represents one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population."23 ' At issue was
not merely 672.5 grams, or one and one-half pounds of cocaine, it
was "between 32,500 and 65,000 doses"239 of cocaine. Regardless
of the fact that Harmelin's crime caused no harm to society, it
threatened to do so. 0 Justice Kennedy went as far as to ratify the
characterization of possession of a large amount of cocaine as being
"as serious and violent as felony murder without specific intent to
kill. "241
As far as the Solem factors were concerned, Justice Kennedy
highlighted the permissive nature of their wording and concluded that
a comparative analysis between Harmelin's sentence and sentences
imposed for other crimes in Michigan, and sentences imposed for the
same crime in other jurisdictions was not necessary?. 2 "Given the
serious nature of the petitioner's crime, "3 Justice Kennedy felt that
M4 Id.
25 Id. at 2705 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 275, 288 (1983)).
2m Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237 Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 275, 296 (1983)).
23 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
239 Id. (emphasis added).
'2 Id. at 2706 (emphasis added).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 2707.
243 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the second and third prongs of the Solem test were disposable.'
In Justice Kennedy's view, the language in Solem which
instructed that "no one factor will be dispositive in any given case""
applied only to the determination of a punishment's
unconstitutionality.' According to the concurrence, a punishment's
passing muster under any one factor would suffice for a determination
that the challenged punishment was constitutional.4 7
Justice Kennedy wrote that "a better reading""8 of Solem and
Weems led to the conclusion that intra- and inter-jurisdictional
analyses were appropriate only for validation purposes, after "an
initial judgment that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the
crime."249 Under this analysis, and "[i]n light of the gravity of the
petitioner's offense," 250 Justice Kennedy determined that Harmelin's
sentence did not give rise to an initial inference of gross
disproportionality and therefore did not warrant comparative
analysis."5 Justice Kennedy's reading of those cases ignores the
obvious questions that it raises: How can that initial judgment of
disproportionality be "informed by objective factors to the maximum
possible extent" 2 2 without intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons?
Why would a sentence require any further analysis after a
determination that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime?
Answers are not found in Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
Aside from making a determination regarding the gravity of
Harmelin's crime,253 the concurrence engaged in no substantive
analysis at all. Justice Kennedy simply slapped a "serious offense"
label on Harmelin's crime and decided that the sentence was not
grossly disproportionate,' in direct contravention of the principles
2" id.
245 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
24 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247 id.
24 Id.
49 Id.
2M Id.
2i Id.
252 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
23 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
id. at 2707.
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set forth in the case he claimed to be relying on to do so.255
iii. The Decision of the Court
The portion of the decision in which the five justices agreed
is relatively brief. In affirming the constitutionality of Harmelin's
sentence, the majority rejected the challenges based on its severe
length and its mandatory operation.256 While the Court recognized
that individualized sentencing -- a separate determination that the
punishment is "appropriate" -- is mandated for capital crimes, it
refused to extend that entitlement to those sentenced to mandatory life
without parole.257 Harmelin's sentence lacked the irrevocability of a
death sentence, since "there remain the possibilities of retroactive
legislative reduction and executive clemency.""
5 In the following term, the same three justices who formed the concurrence to
Harmelin relied once again on this jaded approach to stare decisis in order to "affirm"
Roe v. Wade. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2803 (1992). In a joint opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
maintained it was a respect for precedent that necessitated affirming Roe, yet they
nonetheless saw no impediment to stripping the abortion right of its fundamental status
and upholding a plethora of restrictions that did not appear to place an "undue burden"
on the woman's right. Id. at 2808-2833 passn.
m.' Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701.
2'7 Id. at 2701-02.
" Id. at 2702. Ultimately, relief to those sentenced under the Michigan possession
statute came from thejudiciary. On June 16, 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court struck
down the no-parole feature of the penalty. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich.
1992).
The issue before the Michigan Court in Bullock was the very "and/or"
distinction upon which the Harmelin majority rested its decision. See Harmelin, 111 S.
Ct. at 2701 ("Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the
constitutional sense . . . ."). The Michigan State Constitution prohibits "cruel or
unusual punishment." Mi. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (emphasis added). This difference in
phrasing alone would arguably justify overturning the law, particularly in light of the
fact that all nine members of the United States Supreme Court agreed that mandatory life
imprisonment without parole for an offense of this type is "cruel." See Harmelin, 111
S. Ct. at 2701, 2709 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting); id.
at 2720 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2720 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nevertheless,
the Michigan Court applied a three pronged analysis from an earlier Michigan decision
which closely resembled the Solem test in 'order to invalidate the no-parole penalty.
Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 877. As a result of Bullock, all those sentenced under the
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Ill. Conclusion
While nominally still good law, Solem v. Helm 259 is for all
practical purposes a lame duck after Harmelin. As lower courts are
faced with future challenges to prison sentences, they will be hard-
pressed to reconcile the two cases. The spirit of the Supreme Court's
decision in Solem acknowledged that the Eighth Amendment is
"progressive and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice." 21 In contrast, Harmelin looked resolutely backward, and
proclaimed that "[s]evere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they
are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in
various forms throughout our Nation's history. ,26
1
The proportionality test announced in Solem was designed to
aid courts in making more objective determinations under the Eighth
Amendment and to champion the equitable concerns evident in the
line of cases which preceded it in interpreting the spirit of the
punishments clause. With Hannelin v. Michigan, however, came a
neat bit of constitutional prestidigitation. As seven justices asserted
Solem's vitality, the proportionality guarantee nevertheless vanished
into constitutional thin air.
The Kennedy-O'Connor-Souter interpretation of Solem
obliterated that decision's raison d'etre. By allowing courts to
overlook comparative analysis when the challenged sentence is for an
offense which is "grave, ,262 and by providing drug possession as an
example of a grave offense, the concurrence granted state legislatures
virtual carte blanche in the assignment of terms of imprisonment.
Sentencing laws are legislative decisions, and like all
legislative decisions, are subject to constitutional review. The Solem
standard did not encroach upon legislative autonomy except insofar
as it guaranteed that the power of the legislature to punish criminals
statute, including Ronald Harmelin, are eligible for parole after serving ten years. Id.
at 878.
... 463 U.S. 275 (1983).
o Wems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). See supra notes 66-87 and
accompanying text.
26 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701.
2 Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, I., concurring).
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was exercised in compliance with the Eighth Amendment. The
federal courts have an obligation under Marbury v. Madison263 to do
nothing less.2" Three quarters of a century before Solem, the
Supreme Court acknowledged similar apprehensions regarding the
appearance of judicial infringement on the power of the legislative
branch to set noncapital sentences, even while it asserted an identical,
timeless obligation:
We disclaim the right to assert a judgment against that
of the legislature of the expediency of the laws or the
right to oppose the judicial power to the legislative
power to define crimes and fix their punishment,
unless that power encounters in its exercise a
constitutional prohibition. In such case not our
discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined and
imperative in its direction, is invoked. Then the
legislative power is brought to the judgment of a
power superior to it for the instant. . . [The
legislature has] no limitation, we repeat, but
constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary
must judge.265
Contrary to Justice Scalia's assumption, the benefit which
flows from proper proportionality analysis is that judges are
restrained from placing subjective value judgments on crimes and the
sentences for them, and then either affirming or overruling them.
Indeed, it is the improper analysis of Justice Kennedy which best
illustrates Justice Scalia's objections to a proportionality guarantee.
A judge who rules on the constitutionality of a prison sentence solely
on the basis of his or her own opinion regarding the gravity of the
offense is the very judicial overstepping which, ironically, both
Justice Scalia and the Solem court correctly condemn. It is only with
comparative analysis that Justice Scalia and Solem part company.
The Eighth Amendment can serve no purpose regarding
noncapital sentencing without comparative analysis. Comparative
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177. See supra note 193.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910).
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analysis is the linchpin which ensures that the Eighth Amendment
continues to "draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.266
Justice Scalia referred again and again in his opinion to what
the punishments clause meant rather than what it means. This theory
of historical justification collapses, however, when applied with
similar rigor to other Amendments. As Lawrence Tribe points out
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's 1954 determination
in Brown v. Board of Education267 that school segregation violated the
Equal Protection Clause did not change the meaning of that
Amendment, even though there is little doubt that most of its framers
assumed that a doctrine of "separate but equal" was entirely
consistent with the Amendment they ratified. 6s
From its enactment the Equal Protection Clause was
understood to render unconstitutional the subjugation
of the entire race with the force of law. It took us
longer than it should have to concede that segregating
people in the public schools amounted to subjugating
an entire race by force of law. But the basic principle
remained constant. 69
This reasoning is entirely applicable to Eighth Amendment
analysis. It makes little difference what conceptions the framers
labored under when they proscribed "cruel and unusual punishments"
in 1791 if a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole for
a first time drug offender amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
in 1991. One can only speculate what Justice Scalia made of these
remarks of his fellow justice, written in 1976:
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in
general language and left to the succeeding
generations the task of applying that language to the
2 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S, 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
267 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
13 (1991).
2W9 Id.
220 [Vol. X
1992] PROPORTIONALITY 221
unceasingly changing environment in which they
would live. . . . Where the framers . . . used
general language, they [gave] latitude to those who
would later interpret the instrument to make the
language applicable to cases that the framers might
not have foreseen.27 °
Ironically, despite the fears of its opponents, Solem did not
subvert the constitutional legitimacy of state legislative sentencing
systems. Challenges to noncapital prison sentences under the Solem
standard have been rejected with striking regularity in the Federal
Courts of Appeals.271
I William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693,
694 (1976), quoted in TREBE & DORF, supra note 268, at 13.
21 See, e.g., McCullogh v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530 (1lth Cir. 1992) (sentence of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for first degree burglary and sexual
assault did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922
F.2d 1464 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 140 (1991) (life sentence for distributing
a minuscule amount of heroin was not cruel and unusual punishment); United States v.
LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990) (sentence of 15
years imprisonment was not excessive for conviction of conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
for committing mail fraud, and for conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service);
United States v. Ramirez-DeRosas, 873 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendant's sentence
of 30 months for illegal transportation of aliens did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment even though it constituted more than a six-fold departure upward from the
guideline sentence); United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Furnari v. United States, 491 U.S. 907, cert. denied sub nom. Indelicato v. United
States, 493 U.S. 811 (1989) (one hundred year prison sentences imposed on defendants
convicted of RICO violations and extortion were not excessive); United States v.
Martorano, 866 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (sentence
of life imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed on defendant on his plea of
guilty to charges of masterminding conspiracy to distribute drugs did not violate the
Eighth Amendment); United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (sentence
of five years imprisonment with four year term of supervision to commence upon release
for conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base was not cruel and
unusual punishment); Terrebone v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1020 (1989) (mandatory life imprisonment imposed on 21-year-old heroin
addict convicted of delivering 22 packets of heroin to undercover officer did not
constitute cruel an unusual punishment); United States v. McCann, 835 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026 (1988) (life imprisonment without possibility
of parole imposed upon defendant convicted of conducting a continuing criminal
enterprise was not excessive); United States v. Ray, 828 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 964, cert. denied sub nom. McChriston v. United States, 484 U.S.
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One thing in Harmelin's aftermath is fairly certain: The only
noncapital sentence assuredly unconstitutional under an amalgam of
the Scalia and Kennedy opinions is Rummel's hypothetical sentence
of life imprisonment for overtime parking.272 The closer cases, and
perhaps more than a few not-so-close cases, must invariably go by
the wayside.
Edward J. McGowan211
1945 (1988) (sentence of 25 years imprisonment imposed on defendant who pled guilty
to 12 counts including conspiracy, mail fraud, and transmitting altered postal money
orders was not excessive); Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
945 (1987) (sentence of life imprisonment imposed on habitual offender convicted of
armed robbery did not violate Eighth Amendment); Tyler v. Gunter, 819 F.2d 869 (8th
Cir. 1987) (five year sentence for possession of one eighth of one gram of hashish did
not violate Eighth Amendment); United States v. Gugliemi, 819 F.2d 451 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1019 (1988) (sentence of 25 years incarceration for
interstate transport of obscene materials was not cruel and unusual punishment);
MoLester v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1330 (11th Cir. 1986) (life sentence without parole for
robbery under habitual offender law did not violate Eighth Amendment). The author has
been unable to find a single federal decision where a prison sentence was overturned
under the Solem standard. Westlaw search, Allfeds library, Nov. 10, 1992.
' See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.11 (1980). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text. But see Justice Scalia's opinion, where he allows that such a
punishment could arguably indeed be proportionate, if "overtime parking should one day
become [a] major threat to the common good, and the need to deter it . . . critical."
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2697 n.11 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
27 J.D., New York Law School, 1992. Mr. McGowan is currently an attorney with
the Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid Society in New York City.
